The negotiations between Iran and Oman to establish a joint maritime transit mechanism through the Strait of Hormuz have reached a stage that simultaneously presents an opportunity to reduce energy supply risks and ties its sustainable success to international commitments and the management of parallel threats in the Red Sea.
According to media reports, Iranian and Omani parties have reached conclusions on "the coordinates of the routes," and involved officials have spoken of the proximity of the "Hormuz Agreement." Abbas Araghchi — referred to in reports as the "Foreign Minister" — has indicated that the agreement is "very close" and emphasized that the "full opening" of the strait is contingent on the United States' adherence to the commitments outlined in the June memorandum. At the same time, Hossein Mohibi — identified in reports as the "Spokesman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps" — has conditioned the opening mechanism on the "acceptance of Iran's conditions" and described it as something beyond economics, representing a "source of power" for the country.
Along this path, the Financial Times and summary publications have reported on the planning of meetings involving the foreign ministers of the region and Iran, led by Oman, to advance the plan. In this context, the practical implementation of the opening mechanism is described as requiring the approval or cooperation of the United States; a component that is directly linked to Iranian officials' insistence on the necessity of Washington adhering to the provisions of the June memorandum. Thus, the legal-executive puzzle of the agreement is built not only on the text of the memorandum but also on external guarantees and the roles of extra-regional actors.
The energy market dimensions of these developments are also clear. According to estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 23.2 million barrels of oil and 11.4 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas are expected to pass through the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of 2025. These figures indicate that a safe return of flows from Hormuz could have a tangible effect on global markets, including reducing price pressures and decreasing reliance on risky alternative routes such as Bab-el-Mandeb. In other words, if the joint Tehran-Muscat mechanism is designed and executed correctly, it targets the most direct channel of influence on supply risk.
Despite this, media and research discourse simultaneously emphasizes structural risks. Analytical and defense reports have highlighted the connection between actions in Hormuz and proxy pressures on Bab-el-Mandeb; such that threats could be transferred from groups like Ansar Allah to the Red Sea. This transfer has previously made alternative routes unsafe and, if repeated, would undermine the sustainability of any new mechanism in Hormuz. Therefore, any progress in opening Hormuz will quickly lose its advantage if it is not accompanied by managing tensions in Bab-el-Mandeb.
The shipping industry's perspective completes this picture. Warnings from relevant associations indicate that the return of confidence is a time-consuming process, and even after the announcement of the opening mechanism, ships will proceed cautiously until "real security" is felt. This conclusion underscores the importance of "transparency in routes": the clearer the coordinates of transit are defined and the more transparent the security verification mechanisms, the faster the confidence curve will take shape.
In policy terms, the "Hormuz Agreement" has placed two simultaneous poles on the table: an opportunity for short-term supply stabilization and a risk stemming from transferable insecurities to the Red Sea. The outcome of these two poles depends on the behavior of key players; on one hand, the commitments of the United States within the framework of the June memorandum and the necessary cooperation for operationalizing the routes, and on the other hand, the simultaneous management of tensions in Bab-el-Mandeb so that the advantage of Hormuz is not neutralized. Oman’s role in leading regional meetings, from this perspective, provides a platform where legal certainties and executive guarantees are locked together.
From this framework, three key elements for success can be extracted: first, the presence of a credible external observer who can ensure continuous reporting on the implementation of the routes and adherence to commitments; second, transparency in defining "the coordinates of the routes" and crossing rules that serve as operational decision-making criteria for the shipping industry; and third, linking the opening of Hormuz with the reduction of tensions in Bab-el-Mandeb so that the risky alternative route does not disrupt market expectations. This triplet is the connection between policy and market that manifests itself both at the level of public statements and at the level of ship movements.
Background
The Strait of Hormuz has been at the center of energy and maritime navigation calculations in recent years. The daily passage of millions of barrels of oil and billions of cubic feet of liquefied natural gas through this strategic chokepoint — according to official EIA estimates — has made operational decision-making weighty, and any change in transit status has an immediate reflection in global markets. At a time when alternative routes like Bab-el-Mandeb are also facing threats, the importance of safely returning flows from Hormuz becomes even more critical: any degree of stability in Hormuz, if accompanied by relative security in the Red Sea, helps mitigate price risk and allows for more reliable planning for shipping.
In this context, the discussions between Iran and Oman to create a joint maritime transit mechanism are not a standalone move but a link in a chain that must be simultaneously strengthened at several points. Media reports have outlined the proximity of the memorandum, Iranian officials' references to specific execution conditions, and the planning of regional meetings centered around Muscat as the main facets of this process. In contrast, defense analyses about the possibility of transferring pressure to the Red Sea and industry warnings about the time-consuming nature of restoring confidence have illuminated the roadmap of risks. The output of this gathering is a simple yet decisive calculation: every operational step in Hormuz finds meaning when supported by reliable guarantees and simultaneously prevents the accumulation of risk in Bab-el-Mandeb.
The final conclusion of this process is clear: the "Hormuz Agreement" can stabilize energy supply in the short term, but the realization of this benefit is contingent upon international guarantees and the confidence of the shipping industry. Asymmetric threats in the Red Sea can quickly neutralize the benefits of the agreement. The key to success lies in a credible external observer, transparency in routes, and the simultaneous reduction of tensions in Bab-el-Mandeb.
